Attestation & Capacity
How Tova verifies TEE hardware attestations on-chain and bounds concurrent unsettled provider volume through stake-backed trust capacity.
Two-layer provider security
An open HTTP 402 market faces two risks: endpoints returning unverified outputs, and Sybil providers locking up agent budgets across dozens of unanswered escrows. Tova closes both on-chain in ProviderRegistry:
- Hardware attestation verification binds every
claim_settlementto an Ed25519 signature from a registered TEE key whose quote has not expired. - Stake-backed trust capacity caps the total value of concurrent
Openescrows a provider can hold at once to its lockedstaked_capacity_lamports.
ProviderRegistry PDA: ["provider", provider_signer_pubkey]
Provider Stake PDA: ["provider_stake", provider_registry_pubkey]Supported hardware types
ProviderRegistry.hardware_type is stored as a u8 enum validated on register_provider and update_provider_attestation:
| Enum value | Name | Use case |
|---|---|---|
0 | IntelTDX | Intel Trust Domain Extensions hardware TEE attestation |
1 | AmdSevSnp | AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV-SNP) hardware TEE attestation |
2 | LocalAttested | Deterministic Ed25519 enclave key for localnet testing and development |
Any value greater than 2 rejects with InvalidHardwareType.
Execution receipt signing and on-chain verification
Before calling claim_settlement, the provider signs a domain-separated 99-byte binary message inside its TEE using its registered attestation_pubkey:
receipt_message =
"TOVA_TEE_RECEIPT_V1" (19 bytes, ASCII)
|| settlement_id (8 bytes, u64 little-endian)
|| request_hash (32 bytes)
|| response_hash (32 bytes)
|| receipt_slot (8 bytes, u64 little-endian)The claim transaction places Solana's native Ed25519SigVerify precompile instruction before claim_settlement. Inside claim_settlement, verify_ed25519_precompile reads the Instructions sysvar (Sysvar1nstructions1111111111111111111111111) and confirms that an earlier instruction in the same transaction called Ed25519Program with:
public_key == provider_registry.attestation_pubkeysignature == tee_signature(64 bytes)message == receipt_message(matching the escrow'ssettlement_idandrequest_hash, plus the claimedresponse_hashandreceipt_slot)- All offsets inline (
instruction_index == u16::MAX)
If no matching precompile instruction is found, claim_settlement fails with InvalidAttestation.
Attestation rotation and expiry
Every provider registration carries an attestation_expiry_slot. Both open_settlement and claim_settlement require clock.slot <= provider.attestation_expiry_slot, returning AttestationExpired once a quote ages out.
Providers rotate keys or extend expiry without unstaking by calling update_provider_attestation, signed by provider_signer.
Stake-backed capacity bound
When a provider registers with stake_lamports, register_provider transfers that SOL into provider_stake and sets staked_capacity_lamports = stake_lamports.
Every open_settlement enforces the capacity invariant:
provider.active_unsettled_lamports + amount <= provider.staked_capacity_lamportsIf accepting a new escrow would push unsettled volume above the provider's stake, open_settlement fails with ProviderCapacityExceeded (HTTP 422 in the API, retryable: true). Volume is released as soon as the provider claims (claim_settlement) or an expired escrow refunds (refund_settlement).
The API also computes capacityUtilizationBps for display on Providers:
capacityUtilizationBps = floor((active_unsettled_lamports * 10_000) / staked_capacity_lamports)See Register a TEE Provider to register an endpoint and wrap your HTTP handler with gate402().